

Message Text

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O R 051129Z MAY 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0568

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
COMSIXTHFLT
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 13109

LIMDIS

NAIROBI FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US, CSCE, SALT, FR
SUBJECT: GROMYKO VISIT TO FRANCE: QUAI ASSESSMENT

REF: (A) PARIS 12752 NOTAL (DTG 301925Z APR 76),
(B) PARIS 12335 NOTAL (DTG 281155Z APR 76),
(C) PARIS 12064 NOTAL (DTG 261440Z APR 76),
(D) PARIS 7990 NOTAL (DTG 172001Z MAR 76).

1. SUMMARY: QUAI CONSIDERS THAT "ON THE WHOLE" GROMYKO VISIT WENT WELL. BOTH SIDES MADE EVIDENT EFFORT TO ERASE DISAGREEABLE IMPRESSIONS LEFT BY GISCARD'S MOSCOW VISIT BY STRESSING CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS AND ATTACHMENT TO DETENTE. IN SPITE OF GROMYKO'S RATHER PLAINTIVE AIR-PORT REMARKS THAT FRENCH WERE NOT "DOING ENOUGH" TO IMPLEMENT THESE UNDERSTANDINGS (REF A) QUAI FEELS VISIT'S PUBLIC PURPOSE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. ON OTHER HAND ACTUAL DISCUSSIONS, WHICH FOCUSED LARGELY ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE OF NEW RAPPROCHEMENT. FRENCH DID MAKE THEIR EXPECTED PITCH THAT "DETENTE WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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INDIVISIBLE," PARTICULARLY AS APPLIED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA AND DJIBOUTI. THE SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, REHEARSED THEIR DISARMAMENT LITANY BUT ALSO ENCOUNTERED NO NEW FRENCH CONCESSIONS. BOTH SIDES HAD LONG TALK ON MIDDLE EAST, DURING WHICH SOVIETS COMPLAINED ABOUT U.S. ROLE AND GAVE SAUVAGNARGUES A PREVIEW OF THEIR SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED STATEMENT CALLING FOR RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. THERE WAS ALSO DISCUSSION OF CSCE, INCLUDING

DIFFERENCES OVER BREZHNEV THREE-
CONFERENCE PROPOSALS. BILATERALLY THERE WILL BE
PREDICTED NEGOTIATION ON TREATMENT OF EXCHANGE-TEACHERS,
JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN, ETC. THERE WAS ALSO AGREEMENT
IN PRINCIPLE THAT BREZHNEV WOULD COME TO PARIS TOWARD
END OF YEAR. HOWEVER, NO DATES WERE SET. QUAI NOW
SUSPECTS SOVIET RETICENCE THIS POINT NOT MAINLY DUE
POLITICAL, BUT BREZHNEV HEALTH REASONS. AS EXPECTED,
KOSSYGIN VISIT TO PARIS ALSO POSSIBLE TO HELP CELEBRATE
10TH ANNIVERSARY DE GAULLE'S SOVIET VISIT 1966. ECONOMIC
ISSUES WERE LARGELY DEFERRED, ALTHOUGH FRENCH MADE CLEAR
THAT "DETENTE" MUST ALSO HAVE A "MATERIAL BASIS." END
SUMMARY.

2. QUAI DIRECTOR SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OMNES MADE SPECIAL SCHEDULING EFFORT TO GIVE US PROMPT
BRIEFING GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PROVIDE SECRETARY WITH FULL,
TIMELY ACCOUNT BEFORE ARRIVING PARIS AFTER AFRICAN TRIP.

3. ON ATMOSPHERICS:

BOTH SIDES MADE SPECIAL EFFORT TO WIPE OUT LINGERING

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O R 051129Z MAY 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0569

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 PARIS 13109

LIMDIS

BAD IMPRESSION LEFT BY GISCARD'S MOSCOW TRIP. GROMYKO
WAS "ALMOST CONSISTENTLY AMIABLE," WHICH FRENCH SAY
HE HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN IN PAST. FOR THEIR PART, FRENCH
MADE SPECIAL PROTOCOL EFFORT, EXCEPTIONAL EVEN FOR
GROMYKO, INCLUDING TWO LONG PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH SAU-

VAGNARGUES, THREE PLENARY SESSIONS AND A MAJOR GISCARD LUNCH WITH KEY SUBSTANTIVE MINISTERS, FOLLOWED BY A TALK. MOREOVER, PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WITH EXCEPTION GROMYKO'S AIRPORT INTERVIEW LAMENTING LACK OF FRENCH DRIVE, PARTICULARLY ON DISARMAMENT, ALL STRESSED CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS AND SHARED INTEREST IN DETENTE. AS A RESULT QUAI BELIEVES MAIN PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS ACHIEVED, TO GIVE FRENCH-SOVIET RELATIONS SOME NEW IMPETUS, AT LEAST ON OPTICAL LEVEL.

4. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES:

ON OTHER HAND, PARTICULARLY ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WHICH PREOCCUPIED BULK OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THE TWO SIDES DISCOVERED "NO GREAT NEW RAPPROACHEMENT." FOLLOWING, WE ARE TOLD, WERE MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED:

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A) DETENTE:

AS PREDICTED SAUVAGNARGUES REINFORCED DE COURCEL'S EFFORT IN MOSCOW TO MAKE POINT POLITELY BUT CLEARLY THAT DETENTE IS NOT ONE-WAY STREET. FRENCH INTEND TO PURSUE DETENTE. HOWEVER, THIS PRESUPPOSES MUTUAL COMPREHENSION OF NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF OTHERS. SAUVAGNARGUES CONCLUDED THAT SOVS "SHOULD BE AWARE THAT"CONTINUED BEHAVIOR REFLECTING LACK OF SUCH MODERATION COULD NOT BE SUPPORTED INDEFINITELY." QUAI EMPHASIZES FRENCH DID NOT TRY ANTAGONIZE GROMYKO, BUT DID WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR "CONDITIONS" FOR CONTINUANCE OF DETENTE. GROMYKO REPORTEDLY LARGELY LISTENED. OMNES BELIEVES HE CLEARLY GOT THE POINT.

B) CSCE AND BELGRADE:

GROMYKO, ASSISTED THIS POINT BY SERGEIEFF (PHONETIC), HEAD FONMIN PLANNING STAFF, MADE STANDARD SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT BELGRADE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE SHOULD NEITHER SERVE AS FORUM FOR MUTUAL RECRIMINATION NOR AS DEVICE FOR TAKING NEW DECISIONS WHICH COULD MODIFY FINAL ACT. INSTEAD GROMYKO CLEARLY FORESHADOWED SOVS WANT USE BELGRADE TO "PLAN FUTURE PROJECTS" REFLECTING SPIRIT OF CSCE DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN. IN PLAIN TEXT OMNES SAID THIS MEANT MAJOR SOVIET PUSH FOR BREZHNEV'S THREE CONFERENCE PROPOSAL ON TRANSPORTATION ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT. SAUVAGNARGUES PARRIED THIS POINT BY "DILATING" ON STUDY BREZHNEV PROPOSALS RECEIVING IN ECE CONTEXT IN GENEVA AND NOTING THAT ENERGY, FOR ONE, WAS ALREADY BEING STUDIED

OTHER FORA AS WELL.

EVEN SO, OMNES SAYS, THIS EXCHANGE CONVINCED QUAI
EVEN MORE THAN IN PAST THAT REFERENCES TO ECE WILL
NOT REPEAT NOT SUFFICE TO CONTAIN PRESSURE
SOVIETS INTEND APPLY TO PUT OVER BREZHNEV PROPOSALS
AT BELGRADE; AND THAT (AS ANDREANI ALSO RECENTLY
MENTIONED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN (PARIS
12356 NOTAL) OTHER ARGUMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND
FORESTALL SOVIETS ON THIS POINT.

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C) BERLIN:

SOME TIME WAS ALSO SPENT ON BERLIN, BECAUSE OF
SOVIET COMPLAINTS THAT "CERTAIN COUNTRIES" WERE
NOT STRICTLY RESPECTING QA. IN DEVELOPING POINT
OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT FRG, GROMYKO ONLY REMONSTRATED
IN GENERALITIES. SAUVAGNARGUES REAFFIRMED FRENCH
AND OTHER ALLIES' DETERMINATION THAT QA BE
CORRECTLY APPLIED AND NOTED THAT, APART FROM "CER-
TAIN MINOR PROBLEMS," FRENCH FEEL THAT HAD BEEN
CASE. OMNES SAID QUAI WAS MOST CAREFUL AVOID ANY
CRITICISM OF THE FRG.

D) MBFR:

IN BRIEF EXCHANGE MBFR GROMYKO TRIED PERSUADE
FRENCH THAT STAGNATION OF VIENNA TALKS WAS NOT
EAST'S FAULT BUT RESULTED WEST'S FAILURE GRASP
THAT SECURITY NEEDS OF BOTH SIDES MUST BE
ASSURED. SAUVAGNARGUES LARGELY LISTENED TO THIS
ACCOUNT, ALTHOUGH OMNES SAID, FRENCH AFTERWARDS
FELT COMFORTED THEIR ABSTENTION THIS NEGOTIATION

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O R 051129Z MAY 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0570

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USMISSION USUN

USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

CINCUSNAVEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
COMSIXTHFLT
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 PARIS 13109

LIMDIS

PERMITTED THEM SIT THIS ONE OUT.

E) NEAR EAST:
CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS SPENT ON TWO MAJOR THEMES OF
LEBANON AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, REGARDING
BOTH OF WHICH FRENCH SAY GROMYKO SHOWED "CONCERN"
AND REAL "PERPLEXITY." IN BOTH REGARDS HE ALSO
HELD FORTH AT LENGTH ON BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY
THESE PROBLEMS SHARED BY ISRAEL AND THE U.S.,
WHILE THE USSR IS OBLIGED "RENOUNCE ACTIVE PART
IN THESE AFFAIRS." OMNES SAID GROMYKO WAS "PARTI-
CULARLY HARD" ON THE U.S., WHICH HE
BLAMED FOR LETTING THE LEBANESE PROBLEM DEVELOP
INTO THE PRESENT SITUATION; FOR (UNSPECIFIED)
RECENT ACTIVITIES OF SIXTH FLEET IN EASTERN MEDI-
TERRANEAN, IN LEBANESE CONTEXT; AND FOR "CRUSHING"
THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. NOT SURPRISINGLY
GROMYKO HAD A MORE POSITIVE VIEW OF SYRIAN ROLE,
ALTHOUGH HE STRESSED THEY ARE NOT ALWAYS RESPONS-
IVE SOVIET WISHES OR KEEP SOVS FULLY INFORMED.

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SAUVAGNARGUES EXPLAINED COUVE AND GORSE MISSIONS
TO LEBANON AND THEN ASKED SOVS DEVELOP THEIR THINK-
ING ON A MID-EAST SETTLEMENT, WHICH LED GROMYKO TO
PRODUCE ADVANCE COPY USSR'S MOST RECENT STATEMENT
ON RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH FRENCH
NOTED THAT THIS TEXT GIVES IMPRESSION SOME
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH U.S. VIEWS IN PROVIDING FOR TWO
PHASES, THEY CONCLUDED, FOR PRESENT AT LEAST, THAT
THIS IS DECEPTION, SINCE PALESTINIANS APPARENTLY
WOULD BE PRESENT AT BOTH. SOVIET PAPER THEREFORE
PROBABLE NON-STARTER. ON OTHER HAND QUAI NOW CON-
VINCED THAT SOVS NOT INTERESTED IN USING UN FOR
SETTLEMENT, SINCE GROMYKO SEEMED QUITE DISILLU-
SIONED UN RESOLUTION PROCESS ON ISRAEL, "WHICH GETS
RESOLUTIONS WHITTLED DOWN AND THEN ENDS THEM IN
U.S. VETO."

OMNES STRESSED THAT SOVS DO THINK THAT AN ULTIMATE NEAR-EAST SETTLEMENT WILL REQUIRE STRICT INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND IS FAVORABLE TO IDEA THAT BOTH FRANCE AND THE UK TAKE PART IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS. WE WERE TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT NO DETAILS WERE DISCUSSED.

F) SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS:

GROMYKO'S DISARMAMENT PRESENTATION WAS LESS SWEEPING OR INTERESTING THAN THAT MADE TO DE COURCEL (REF D), ALTHOUGH GROMYKO VERY EMPHATICALLY STRESSED IMPORTANCE SOVS ATTACH THESE THEMES. INTERESTINGLY SOVS ONLY MENTIONED FOUR OF THEIR PROJECTS THIS OCCASION: THE TOTAL TEST BAN; THE NON-USE OF FORCE AGREEMENT; BANNING NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; AND THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION WAS LONGISH, OMNES SAID NOTHING NEW EMERGED. FRENCH MERELY REITERATED THAT ON FIRST TWO PROPOSALS THEY COULD NOT AGREE FOR OBVIOUS REASONS NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST; WHEREAS ON LAST TWO, THEY ARE NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE SINCE PREREQUISITES NOT YET ESTABLISHED.

FRENCH STRESSED THAT, AS EVIDENCED LONDON SUPPLIERS CONFERENCE, THEY ARE READY TO CONTRIBUTE

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WHEN THERE IS SOMETHING CONCRETE THEY CAN DO. GROMYKO LISTENED BUT THEN COMPLAINED TO SAUVAGNARGUES THAT HE WISHED FRENCH WOULD PUT "MORE OF THEIR SOUL INTO THIS EFFORT." FRENCH THOUGHT THIS AMUSING UNTIL GROMYKO'S AIRPORT STATEMENT TO SAME EFFECT SHOWED HE REALLY MEANT IT.

G) SALT AND US-USSR RELATIONS:

GROMYKO REPORTED SALT PROCESS CONTINUES BUT HAD ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF US POSITION ON CRUISE MISSILES, ON WHICH NO FORMULA HAS BEEN FOUND SO FAR. HOWEVER, MOSCOW STILL HOPED FOR AGREEMENT. AS REGARDS US RELATIONS, MOSCOW REALIZES ELECTION CAMPAIGN REQUIRES CERTAIN "LATITUDES." KEY REMAINS BREZHNEV VISIT. ONCE SALT IS SIGNED THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM WITH BREZHNEV COMING TO U.S.

H) AFRICA:

SAUVAGNARGUES GAVE LONG EXPLANATION OF DJIBOUTI

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O R 051129Z MAY 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0571

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 PARIS 13109

LIMDIS

PROBLEM, STRESSING SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN DIMENSION, AND FRENCH DETERMINATION SEE DJIBOUTI THROUGH TO INDEPENDENCE. IN THIS CONTEXT SOVIET EFFORT AT INDUCING MODERATION COULD BE USEFUL TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND USSR. GROMYKO REITERATED SOVS DESIRE FOR A "POLITICAL SOLUTION" AND CLAIMED USSR HAD ALREADY INFORMED SOMALIS AND ETHIOPIANS THAT "REASONABLE POSITIONS WOULD BE DESIRABLE." OMNES ADDED THAT FRENCH THINK THIS MAY IN FACT BE TRUE.

SAUVAGNARGUES THEN RAISED IN BROAD GENERAL TERMS PROBLEM OF SUPER-POWER INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA, PARTICULARLY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, POINTING OUT THAT THIS IS NOT GOOD FROM ANY POINT OF VIEW. GROMYKO ARGUED LAMELY THAT USSR SUPPORTS LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. SAUVAGNARGUES THEN WEIGHED IN HEAVILY, NOTING THAT IF THIS SUPPORT IS EXTREME AND NOT MODERATE IT CAN HAVE VERY BAD EFFECTS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND BEYOND THAT ON DETENTE IN GENERAL WHICH, SAUVAGNARGUES BLUNTLY REITERATED IN THIS CONTEXT, IS "INDIVISIBLE." FRENCH SIDE FELT HERE

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AGAIN THAT SOVS CLEARLY RECEIVED MESSAGE, INCLUDING LOW-KEY EXPRESSION FRENCH HOPE CUBANS WOULD LEAVE

SOON.

THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION QUAI WAS STRUCK BY CONSISTENT "FEEBLENESS" GROMYKO'S HANDLING SOUTH-ERN AFRICAN QUESTION, DURING WHICH HE SEEMED CONSISTENTLY ILL AT EASE.

I) CHINA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA:

IN VERY BRIEF DISCUSSION GROMYKO SAID THAT HE WAS "COMPLETELY CONFUSED" CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS AT THIS POINT, ALTHOUGH USSR PREPARED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. SOVIETS CLAIMED TO BE EQUALLY BADLY INFORMED ON CAMBODIA, ON WHICH SAUVAGNARGUES PROVIDED QUICK RUN-DOWN. ON OTHER HAND, FRENCH REPROACHED SOVS FOR EXPANDING THEIR ROLE IN LAOS AT FRENCH EXPENSE, PRESUMABLY HOLDING THE SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE AT LEAST IN PART FOR THE DPRL REDUCTION OF FRENCH CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

5. BILATERAL ISSUES PLAYED A RELATIVELY MINOR ROLE, AND WERE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A) BREZHNEV VISIT:

QUESTION OF BREZHNEV VISIT WAS DISCUSSED EXCLUSIVELY AT ELYSEE. GISCARD OFFERED INVITATION IN PRINCIPLE. GROMYKO ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT DEFERRED FIXING OF DATE FOR LATER EXCHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

AS A CONSEQUENCE QUAI NOW ASSUMES VISIT MIGHT WELL TAKE PLACE BEFORE END OF YEAR, PERHAPS AROUND OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER AND IS INCLINED TO ATTRIBUTE GROMYKO'S UNWILLINGNESS DISCUSS DATES TO GENUINE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH BREZHNEV'S HEALTH. OMNES NOTES IN THIS CONNECTION THAT USSR HAS SO FAR AVOIDED SETTING PRECISE DATES FOR ANY OF BREZHNEV'S PROPOSED VISITS THIS YEAR, REINFORCING QUAI VIEW THAT BREZHNEV'S CONDITION PROBABLY REQUIRES PERIODIC TREATMENT AND PERIODS OF RECUPERATION, PREVENTING MOSCOW FROM MAKING LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS INVOLVING HIS PARTICIPATION.

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PATION.

AT SAME TIME QUAI REMAINS CONSCIOUS OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY THAT DELAY IN SETTING BREZHNEV PARIS DATE MAY ALSO BE DUE CONTINUING MOSCOW UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING ITS POSTURE TOWARD PCF; UNCERTAINTIES WHICH COULD NOT ONLY INVOLVE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS WITHIN KREMLIN ITSELF BUT ALSO RELATE TO POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF A BREZHNEV VISIT ON PCF ATTITUDES TOWARD RENEWED SOVIET

EFFORTS TO CONVENE A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE.
FINALLY, QUAI NOTES THAT TIMING OF BREZHNEV VISIT WILL
IN ANY CASE REQUIRE NICE CALCULATION SO AS NOT TO MAKE
VISIT MAJOR ISSUE, PARTICULARLY FROM PCF VIEW POINT, IN
NEXT YEAR'S FRENCH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

B) TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF DE GAULLE VISIT TO USSR:

SOVIETS PRESSED HARD TO MAKE MOST OF THIS ANNIVERSARY.
AS A RESULT, QUAI THINKS KOSSYGIN MAY USE CHIRAC'S INVI-
TATION TO COME TO PARIS END OF JUNE - EARLY JULY TO PAR-
TICIPATE MIXED COMMISSION MEETING SET TO COINCIDE THAT

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O R 051129Z MAY 76

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
CINCUSNAVEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
COMSIXTHFLT
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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LIMDIS

OCCASION. QUAI ALSO EXPECTS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON IMPROVEMENT WORKING CONDITIONS FOR EXCHANGE TEACHERS, JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN, ETC., AGREED ON IN PRINCIPLE DURING GROMYKO VISIT, TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME TO PERMIT EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH CSCE OVERTONES AT THAT TIME. LASTLY, GISCARD REPORTEDLY TOLD GROMYKO CLEARLY THAT DETENTE MUST ALSO HAVE MATERIAL BASIS, AND THAT RECENT PETERING OUT OF PACE FRENCH-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED. ONE MIGHT THEREFORE ASSUME 10TH ANNIVERSARY JAMBOREE COULD ALSO PRODUCE NEW ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDINGS.

6. COMMENT: LONG QUAI BRIEFING GENERALLY CONFIRMS OUR FEELING THAT MAIN RESULT GROMYKO VISIT WAS TO REVERSE DETERIORATION FRENCH-SOVIET ATMOSPHERICS AFTER LAST

YEAR'S GISCARD TRIP. ON OTHER HAND, FRENCH HAVE ALSO SHOWN SURPRISING SPUNK DURING DE COURCEL AND GROMYKO'S VISITS IN MAKING CLEAR TO MOSCOW THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED BUY THIS BETTER ATMOSPHERE AT ANY PRICE, AND THAT DETENTE, EVEN ON BILATERAL LEVEL, HAS TO BE TWO-WAY STREET. WHILE SOME OF FRENCH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS THIS REGARD WAS AIMED AT GETTING SOVS TO HELP ON DJIBOUTI, CONFIDENTIAL

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THE FACT THAT THEY ALSO RELATED THIS PROPOSITION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, AS WELL AS TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL CAN ONLY BE SEEN AS HELPFUL FROM U.S. POINT OF VIEW. MOREOVER, IF ABOVE ACCOUNT IS ACCURATE, FRENCH YIELDED LITTLE GROUND ON OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, SUCH AS DISARMAMENT. TAKEN TOGETHER THIS TENDS EXPLAIN CURIOUS PLAINTIVENESS GROMYKO'S AIRPORT STATEMENT. IN SUM, BASED WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR, FRENCH HANDLING VISIT STRIKES US AS FIRM, PROFESSIONAL ADMIXTURE OF THE RIGHT PROPORTIONS.
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